Introduction

The continuing unrest in Southern Thailand since January 2004 to present day has resulted in more than 3,611 deaths and injured about 6,073 persons

Malaysian PM readies for visit to deep South

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak will visit Bangkok in early December before joining Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva on a tour of the three southernmost provinces

Muslim Malay of Patani

The Patani Malays or Muslim Malay of Patani are living primarily in Patani Raya, the southern provinces of Thailand..

The Ancient City of Yarang

The ancient city of Yarang was one of the biggest communities in the early historical period in the south of Thailand and believed to be the location of the ancient domain name “ Langkasuka”

Anatomy of a Forgotten Conflict

The only long-term solution combines firm action against the perpetrators of violence and "substantive autonomy" for the three southernmost provinces

Thursday, August 25, 2011

Talks the only way forward for southern Thailand

In her customary birthday-eve address last Thursday, Thailand's Queen Sirikit told prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra one of her top concerns was the ongoing violence in the south. Ms Yingluck has proposed a similar degree of autonomy for the region as in Bangkok and Pattaya, which elect their governors. In other provinces, governors are appointed by Bangkok. But army chief general Prayuth Chan-ocha has publicly called the idea ''premature.'' 

Talks in various regional capitals between a government backed delegation and representatives of southern Malay Muslim insurgent groups, are paused because of the change of guard in Bangkok.
But analysts say the only way forward is to continue to talk, despite the apparent lack of breakthroughs.
Chulalongkorn University professor of political science Panitan Wattanayagorn, until recently spokesman for former premier Abhisit Vejjajiva who backed the talks, said the new government ‘’should maintain some level of communication to increase trust and confidence.’’
‘’Any discontinuation would not be good for the long term future.’’
Kasturi Mahkota, usually based in Sweden and representing the Pattani United Liberation Front (PULO), who has been a part of the talks, told The Straits Times ‘’We are waiting for a signal from the Yingluck government.’’
Thailand's Narathiwat province has seen two violent prison riots in three months - the latest on Thursday.
Almost daily roadside bombs and ambushes mainly targeted at security forces, and symbols and collaborators of the Thai state - official and civilians including monks - continue to puncture the peace in the Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani.
Security forces strike back with raids and detentions - and occasionally torture. Muslim religious figures are often targets. The militarization of the region is evident from roadblocks, armed patrols, and army camps surrounded by razor wire and sandbags.
The death toll after just seven years of the current cycle of violence stands at well over 4,500 - more than all those killed in 30 years of conflict between the United Kingdom and northern Ireland's Irish Republican Army.
Some 30-40 per cent of the violent incidents may be due to personal and criminal conflicts and vendettas; the region is also awash with guns in the hands of militias and criminals, and tit for tat killings are almost commonplace.
The ongoing violence shows that while the Thai army has contained the militant insurgency to a degree, separatists have increased levels of professionalism and continue to recruit, noted Anthony Davis this month in Jane's Intelligence Review.
Davis noted that ‘’on average nearly 50 people were killed and 75 injured every month over the first half of 2011 in violent incidents in the region, adding to a toll that has exceeded 4,600 dead and 7,000 wounded since January 2004.’’
‘’The underground separatist community has not merely survived but adapted and matured, while developing new skill sets and levels of competence.’’
There remains a wide gulf between the view of the conflict from Bangkok, and that of the Malay Muslims in the south.
‘’The southern Thai conflict is a war over legitimacy’’ professor Duncan McCargo of the UK's Leeds University wrote in his 2009 book ''Tearing Apart the Land.''
‘’For significant numbers of Patani Malays, Thai rule over their region has long lacked legitimacy.’’
‘’Substantive autonomy - probably called something else - is probably the only long-term solution that might satisfy most parties to the conflict.’’
Through the lens of the Bangkok establishment, autonomy opens the door to independence. On a recent day visit to the south after the election, when he was still foreign minister, Mr Kasit Piromya who now sits in parliament as part of the opposition, wondered aloud at the nature of the grievances of Malay Muslims.
He pointed out - correctly - that the Muslim population had complete religious and cultural freedom. But he made no mention of the issue of justice, and said talk of autonomy would stall any negotiations at the gate.
Separately, a mid-level ministry of foreign affairs official insisted that militants constituted only a small minority. Yet she was unable to explain how a small minority could survive without popular sympathy, if not active support.
‘’That is typical of Bangkok’’ said Don Pathan, a prominent Thai journalist based in Yala. ‘’But Malay Muslims have their own narrative, their own heroes.’’
But even Mr Kasit said there was no option but to continue dialogue.
Each side, however, needs to offer a concession. The insurgent representatives need to show the militants they have the clout to wrest a concession. And the Thai state wants proof that the men in the talks can call a halt to attacks - something that is not entirely clear.
While there have been small signs of progress in the south, much more has remained unchanged. Rights activist Pornpen Khongkachonkiet of the independent Cross Cultural Foundation which is active in the south, in an interview said ‘’I am doing the same thing I was doing five years ago. I'm looking for details of three detainees. I'm trying to find out where they are. Two have been missing for three months.’’
However, that talks have been taking place at all - involving Thailand's National Security Council and a senior army general - is a good sign, said an analyst who is closely following the process.
‘’Mountains have moved’’ he said. ‘’If you compare where we are to two years ago, it is extraordinary.’’
‘’The government has made tremendous progress in engaging with insurgent groups in open-ended dialogue which has official status, with the army involved, and the army chief kept informed.’’
Recently a group of civil society representatives, both Buddhists and Muslims, also held talks with representatives of insurgency groups outside Thailand.
Noted Anthony Davis : ‘’In a break with traditional mindsets, both insurgent representatives and the National Security Council.. have separately conceded that the role of civil society will be central in formulating solutions to the conflict.’’
av Nirmal Ghosh kl. den 15 augusti 2011 kl. 15:53

Saturday, July 9, 2011

Analysis: A debate over autonomy in Thailand's restive south


YALA, Thailand (Reuters) - The motorcycle bomb burned the 27-year-old woman so badly her father only recognized her by a tattoo. She lost half her face and an arm in the attack by shadowy Muslim separatists in Thailand's troubled deep south.
"The wound was awful. She must have suffered enormously," said her father, Athorn Buakwan, a Buddhist farmer, as he held a framed photograph of his daughter and recalled his frantic search for her on the afternoon she was killed and 17 others were wounded in a market in the capital of Yala province.
That February 21 attack is one of many illustrating the growing sophistication of a Muslim insurgency that has killed at least 4,500 people since 2004 in Thailand's three southernmost provinces, a region of dense jungles and rubber plantations just a few hours' drive from world-class beach resorts.
Contained within a far-flung fringe of Thailand, the conflict gets scant attention from international media. And yet the death toll it has brought over just seven years exceeds the casualties in Northern Ireland's three decades of troubles.
Now, as a security force of 60,000 to struggles to contain the violence, Thailand's July 3 election is reviving a debate over how to end it. With no easy answers and more violence looking inevitable, the campaign is touching a taboo in Buddhist Thailand: more political power for its minority Muslims.
A central question is whether the provinces on Malaysia's doorstep - Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani - should be allowed greater autonomy, a sensitive issue in Thailand which annexed the region in 1909 when it was an independent Malay sultanate.
Successive governments have sought, with mixed results, to assimilate the population into the Thai Buddhist mainstream.
About 94 percent of its 1.7 million people are Muslim, the dominant Malay religion, and about 80 percent speak a Malay dialect as a first language, according to a 2010 survey by the San Francisco-based Asia Foundation.
They chafe at the presence of Buddhist provincial governors appointed by the Interior Ministry in Bangkok and want more say in their own affairs - from adding Islam and local history to a Buddhist-influenced Thai school curriculum to bilingual street signs in Thai and Malay.
"If you talk to people on all sides of the political divide they recognize the need for decentralization of power, but it is unspeakable," said Duncan McCargo, a professor of Southeast Asian politics at the University of Leeds.
"Admitting you need to decentralize power in the south is to admit there is a problem with the legitimacy of the Thai state. And to admit that is to go back to what the Thai state is based on, which is arguably the shibboleth of the nation, religion, king," he added. "Once you start to admit there is a problem with that, you are in danger of treasonous sentiments."
'THAIS ARE THAIS'
But the issue is making headlines. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva flew to Yala on Tuesday, promising more power to municipalities if his Democrat Party wins the election, a shift from past policies focused on economic and social development but not quite the semi-autonomy locals want.
After coming to power in 2008, he declared politics, not the army, would bring peace. But the unrelenting bloodshed, and the absence of a Muslim in his cabinet, could cost him votes.
After winning 11 of the region's 12 seats in a 2005 election, they took just five in the next poll in 2007. Locals say he will struggle to hold those.
His rival and national front-runner, Yingluck Shinawatra, a sister of ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra, said in Yala last week that she would turn the three provinces into a special administrative zone with one elected governor.
The proposal faced swift criticism from army chief Prayuth Chan-ocha, who was instrumental in the coup that toppled her brother. "Any action that may serve to undermine our strength or weaken state authority should be of concern," he said. "What is important is that Thais are Thais."
Not all Muslims embrace her idea, either. Fifty-one percent of those surveyed by the Asia Foundation opposed folding the provinces into a single elected government. Most want elected governors in all three provinces.
Yingluck has another problem: her brother is blamed for fuelling the dramatic rise in violence from 2004. He dismantled a southern security body and replaced it with an abusive and heavy-handed force. But while in power from 2001 to 2006, he appointed a Muslim to a ministerial role, winning some support.
Former army chief Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, a prominent Muslim who oversaw the 2006 coup, has launched his own party, Matubhum, and predicts he will win at least eight seats -- enough to have influence in a possible coalition government.
He reckons he can solve the conflict within the year. His solution: a ministry that would tackle the unrest and direct election of governors in the three provinces.
'LEANER AND MEANER'
The insurgency is becoming more tactical, better organized and more precise in its hits, experts say. In the first five months of this year, for instance, militants set off five car bombs, compared with just three over the whole of 2010.
The number of violent incidents, mostly gunfire and bombs, averaged about 70 a month from January to May, killing an average 41 people a month, up slightly from last year.
"What is happening is that these guys are getting much better at what they do. In effect, they are today leaner and meaner," said Anthony Davis, an analyst at IHS Jane's, a global security consulting firm.
"They are getting a bigger bang for their buck in terms of the resources they put in - from manpower to time, intelligence and preparation. Consequently the casualty rate is higher."
The insurgents' goals are murky but are believed to involve separatism or at least greater autonomy. However, Western diplomats believe only about half of the violence is insurgency-related, with the rest linked to the drug trade or organized crime.
Most experts believe attacks are organized by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) Coordinate, an offshoot of the Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front established in the 1960s to seek independence.
Another group, the Patani United Liberation Front (PULO), publicly calls for a separatist state and claims to control much of the insurgency.

"I hope this election will bring a strong Thai government. For the past 10 years, it has been very weak governments who cannot make any decisions," said Kasturi Mahkota, foreign affairs chief of PULO who lives in Sweden and has led talks with the Thai government on ending the fighting.
He said talks were on hold pending the election after a meeting in May in Manila at which the government agreed, as a gesture of goodwill, to try to release a PULO militant who was arrested by Malaysian authorities in 1998 and remains in a Thai prison.
"If they release him, that would show us if their side has power enough to make decisions," said Kasturi.
INSURGENTS FEARED MORE THAN TROOPS
Amid the almost-daily violence, Muslims and Buddhists who lived harmoniously together for generations are increasingly drifting apart.
"In the past, we were friends with Muslims," said Athorn, whose daughter was killed. "Now, it's distant. Both sides fear one another. It looks like they want Buddhists out so they can rule the area."
More Muslims have been killed than Buddhists in the insurgency because they are often targeted for working for the state or businesses tied to Buddhists, or for refusing to cooperate with insurgents. Indeed, the Asia Foundation poll showed more people fear the insurgents than the military.
"When I leave for work, I feel scared," said Aminah Kaming, a soft-spoken 30-year-old Muslim in Lam Mai district whose husband was shot dead by suspected insurgents while cutting grass. There were no witnesses and, out of fear, she refuses to speculate over who killed him.

(Editing by Alan Raybould and John Chalmers)

Sunday, May 8, 2011

From Gold Leaves to Minaret



The intersecting calls of the muezzins pierce the sweltering equatorial air as Ahmad Abdurrahman, imam of Narathiwat's central mosque, arrives on a racketing and underpowered moped to lead the noon prayer. "We're 80 percent Muslim here," he says, with an engaging smile.
Climb to the top of the minaret of Abdurrahman's modern, almost futuristic, mosque and he will show you a stunning view: palm-fringed beaches running along the South China Sea, wooden fishing boats moored in jostling huddles in the creek and lush plantations of oil palms and rubber trees that stretch to a mountainous horizon.
This is Thailand, and it looks like paradise - complete with a serpent named poverty.
Economic growth, however robust, has a hard time eradicating the country's rural poverty and urban squalor, particularly here in Thailand's deep south. Narathiwat is only 840 kilometers (520 miles) as the crow flies from the capital Bangkok - but it might as well lie in another country in terms of race, religion, culture and even language.
"The Muslims are the poorest people in Thailand," imam Ahmad says. "We need government assistance." Eighty kilometers (50 miles) to the northwest, Chamnong Koomrak, governor of Pattani province, replies, "We're trying.... Our budget is growing by 10 percent a year. We give special privileges to Muslims to enter university and we want to develop the south, in fisheries, food-processing and tourism."

The truth is that there are few shortcuts to development anywhere. Both the government in Bangkok and the Muslim electorate in Thailand's southern provinces of Pattani, Satun, Narathiwat and Yala know that the key to prosperity is education. For the authorities, that means instruction in the Thai language. The people of the south agree - but they intend at the same time to preserve their religion and their culture.
The result is a fascinating renaissance of Muslim awareness spreading across the narrow, elongated arm of land that reaches down from the body of Buddhist Thailand in the north to the Muslim nation of Malaysia in the south. You see it every where, from the simple yet elegant central mosque in Pattani to the corrugated-iron mosques of the fishing villages along the eastern coast. You see it, too, among the 1,700 students who cram the classrooms of Narathiwat's Islamic Foundation for Education, built 20 years ago with a donation from the late King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. And you sense it in the faces of the tiny children learning Arabic from Jitsom bint Salih in a one-room madrasa, or Qur'anic school, in the sand-swept coastal hamlet of Ban Budi.
So who are these Thai Muslims? To government statisticians they are one of Thailand's minorities, perhaps four percent of a population now numbering about 55 million, overwhelmingly concentrated in the far south. To their Buddhist compatriots they are known as khaek, a word that means "visitor" in the Thai language - though the Muslims came to the region several centuries before the Thais.
To any real visitor, however - afarang or foreigner from overseas - the ethnic identity of the Muslims is obvious: They are Malay, just like their neighbors and relatives in the northern Malaysian states of Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis. The two groups dress the same way: patterned sarong and white skullcap or angular black songkok hat for the men, long-sleeved dress and dawa head-scarf for the women. They speak the same Malay language, although many of the fishing families have a dialect all their own. And, most of all, they worship God in the same way, recoiling from the ornamented figures of Buddhism, Thailand's state religion. The fact that they bear Thai, not Malaysian, citizenship has nothing to do with cultural affinity - but it has everything to do with the politics of the past.
The Malays originated on the island of Borneo, now divided between Malaysia's Sabah and Sarawak and Indonesia's Kalimantan. About 1,500 years ago they began an expansion that took them south and west through the islands of Indonesia and northward to the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula. Meanwhile, the Thais - originating perhaps in southeastern China - were expanding southward in competition with peoples like the Shans, Mons and the Khmers of today's Kampuchea. The inevitable meeting of Thai and Malay came around the beginning of the 13th century.

But this meeting was not a clash of nations in any modern sense. Southeast Asia nearly 800 years ago was a shifting patchwork of kingdoms, each vying for tribute and influence but not necessarily for conquest. The Siamese, as the Thais used to be known, had one kingdom - but so did the Khmers, while to the south there were the kingdoms of Majahapit and Langchia. Just as the medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun theorized, when a state was vigorous, it expanded in territory and influence at the expense of weaker states - until the weak in turn became strong and led a fresh cycle of change.
Today's Muslim provinces of southern Thailand are the descendants of Malay kingdoms that in the Middle Ages paid tribute - in the form of bunga mas, or ornamental flowers of gold and silver - to the king of Siam. The payment of flowers showed a degree of loyalty to the king, and dependence on his protection against rival forces. It hardly mattered that the Siamese were purveyors of the region's Buddhist and Hindu tradition, while the Malays were 14th-century converts to Islam. What was at stake was power, not culture.
Yet it is the cultural difference between Thailand's Buddhist majority and Muslim minority that has imbued the south with its distinct flavor. This has survived the centuries, from the days when flowers were given as tribute to the modern era of representation - by a handful of Muslim deputies - in Thailand's National Assembly in Bangkok.

The mosque and the pondok, a religious boarding school for young Muslims, were the reason the culture survived. They still are, though the pondok is fast disappearing in favor of the madrasa, which receives government help in return for teaching secular subjects, including the Thai language, alongside the religious curriculum.
Turn off the main highway between Pattani and Narathiwat, go a kilometer or so along a mud road between glistening, luminous-green rice paddies, and you come to the Telok Manok mosque, built more than 300 years ago. Only a small minaret reminds you of Islam's Arabian origins; otherwise, the building, with walls and floor of heavy wood and roof of small, scalloped red tiles, is more reminiscent of an Indonesian longhouse.
The Telok Manok mosque is part of an Islamic tradition that remains real for almost all Thai Muslims. Late on a rainswept afternoon, we met young men there who were making a form of pilgrimage to the region's oldest mosque. Muhammad Said and Muhammad Hashim had both come from their homes in the Malaysian state of Perak. They were visiting their Thai friends, Muhammad Bidi Talodin and his cousin Ramli Talodin. We conversed in neither Thai nor Malay but in Arabic: Muhammad Bidi learned the language as a student in Benghazi, Libya, and 30-year-old Ramli had spent four years in Kuwait and six in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he graduated with a degree in education. Now he teaches at the Islamic Foundation school in Narathiwat, keeping both tradition and culture alive.
Ramli and his colleagues use Arabic, as well as Malay, to promote the faith and its teachings. That may seem obvious: All good Muslims are supposed to be able to read the Qur'an in Arabic. But contrast it with Malaysia: In that country, where Islam is the state religion, most people now have difficulty reading the jawi, or Arabic, script because the written Malay language has been romanized. The Muslims of Thailand, however, invariably use the Arabic script when writing their language, be it in the mosque or outside.
For preserving and strengthening the use of Arabic, the Muslims of Thailand can thank their brethren in the Arab world. Since the mid-1970's, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula - especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar - have offered scholarships to Thai Muslims to pursue both religious and secular studies in the Middle East. Though there are only about half a dozen scholarships a year to any one country, their impact is enormous. Few Thai Muslims speak the national language well enough to enter a Thai university, so the chance to pursue advanced studies in an Arab country is a real boon. At the Narathiwat school, over 50 of the staff are graduates of universities in the Arab world. Fuad Tayyib, now aged 30, studied mathematics at Riyadh University; Nasir al-Din Hamid majored in Islamic studies in Kuwait; Hassan Hajj Ahmad is an alumnus of a high school in Kuwait and of the University of Qatar.
And there is even a chance to go to the most famous center of Islamic learning, al-Azhar University in Cairo. 'Umar Tayyib, the director of the Narathiwat school, says proudly, "Next year we should have three students at al-Azhar." And when they return? Naturally they will pass on their learning, just like the Narathiwat imam, Ahmad Abdurrahman. He went to Makkah to live at the age of 10 - "because my father was a shaykh in the mosque and wanted me to study Islam" - and then studied at al-Azhar in the 1960's and 1970's.
By now, enough students have returned from the Arab world to constitute a nucleus of Arabic-language teacher training in Thailand itself. Jitsom bint Salih, for example, teaches the children of her poor fishing village the Arabic that she learned not in the Middle East but in the Islamic Institute in Pattani - and the slogan on the wall of her tiny schoolroom proclaims in Arabic, "Teach the people what they do not know."
But we are leaping over the centuries. What happened between the days of bunga mas and the modern era? The answer is two-fold: First, Islam grew deep roots in the region; and second, the European powers arrived in Southeast Asia. Both factors were troublesome complications for successive Siamese monarchs.
Islam arrived in the wake of commerce. Muslim traders from the Middle East and India brought their religion with them as they sailed to Southeast Asia in search of spices and other riches. By the early 17th century Pattani had established itself as the center of Islamic learning in the Malay Peninsula. For the next 200 years and more Pattani produced scholars who not only translated Arabic texts for Malay readers but who also wrote their own religious works. Daud ibn Abdullah ibn Idris al-Fatani, for example, was a theologian whose expertise in fiqh, or jurisprudence, was recognized even in Makkah.
But the stronger Islam became in the region, the more its adherents identified not with the distant king of Siam but with their coreligionists in the Malay states to the south. The result was a series of uprisings, encouraged in part by the insensitivity of the Siamese bureaucrats to Muslim custom. By 1890 a Muslim writer described the officials who came to diminish the power of the traditional rulers and of the 'ulama, the religious leaders who advised them, as "the leeches and parasites of the state."
Such tensions, leading at one point to the exile of the ruler of Pattani, also reflected international conflicts. By the 16th century, Europe's colonial powers were competing for the land and resources of Southeast Asia. At first, the Siamese were pressed to grant trading concessions - to the Dutch, for example, giving them a monopoly over part of the country's external trade, and to the Portuguese to trade with certain Malay states. But soon Siam's independence was at stake. The French were approaching from their new domain in Laos and other parts of Indochina; the British were threatening to encroach both from India in the west and from Singapore and the Malay Peninsula in the souths.
By the beginning of this century the reformer King Chulalongkorn desperately needed some formula to stop his domain being nibbled away by the rival ambitions of the French, British, Russians, Germans and even Turks. The answer was the Anglo-Siamese Agreement of 1909: The King formally ceded tributary rights to four of Siam's southernmost Muslim provinces - Kedah, Terengganu, Kelantan and Perlis - to Britain in exchange for Britain's recognition of Siamese sovereignty over Pattani and the principalities surrounding it. It was a clever move for both parties: By sacrificing part of their traditional authority, the Siamese won the implicit protection of the British, who for their part could enjoy the plantation riches of northern Malaya while keeping Siam as a neutral buffer state between British India and French Indochina.
The only problem was that the agreement left many Muslims north of the new border to co-exist with a Buddhist majority with which they had little mutual sympathy. This juxtaposition led to the emergence, in the last 40 years, of various movements seeking Muslim independence from Thai rule.
Fortunately, governments can learn from their mistakes, and King Chulalongkorn's conciliatory instructions to his ministers three-quarters of a century ago have been recalled: "We regard [Islam] as a religion for those people in that part of the country." Muslim wishes have been heard and Muslims' circumstances have improved. Each Muslim province now has a central mosque built with government funds - to the tune of $1 million in the case of Ahmad Abdurrahman's mosque in Narathiwat. In Pattani, Governor Chamnong says, "Everyone is free to worship in his own way - but we want every Muslim to speak Thai. They are people of this country, and Thai is the official language." But that does not have to mean losing the culture of Islam, the governor adds: "We're trying to open a new faculty at the university in Islamic studies, so that the people don't have to go to Cairo."

In the meantime, life in the southern provinces goes on with the relaxed rhythm imposed by nature. Take away the small businessmen of Hatyai, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat and most of Thailand's Muslims are rice farmers, plantation workers or fishermen. Life is hard, but simple. From fishing villages like Panare scores, even hundreds, of kolae fishing boats go out with the tide each day. Their steep, pointed prows are a mass of intricately painted curls; sterns and sides often bear beautiful paintings of Alpine scenes that none of the fishermen will ever see in real life. In the fields, the farmers and their families toil over the rice plants.
To the visiting farang, the scenes are a delightful passport to an era urbanized man has left behind. For the Thai Muslims entertainment is still a communal enjoyment. The fishing families huddle around a shared television. In villages like Chana, the inhabitants gather in the early morning to raise dozens of caged doves aloft on six-meter (20-foot) metal poles. The doves burst into songs that are judged for pitch, melody and volume. An outsider can hardly tell even from which direction the dove song is coming - but the owners can, and a bird that wins a major competition can end up being worth $12,000.
Will it stay this way forever? Perhaps not. Development, although slow, will bring cars to replace the ubiquitous mopeds. The potential of the valuable tin deposits in the hills is bound to force change. Fishermen will leave the dangers of the sea for easier jobs in the small factories now sprouting on the outskirts of Hatyai and Yala. Families may decide that watching the new television set carries more immediate interest than teaching a dove to sing.
But one thing seems certain to survive, and even grow: the interest in Islam. At the central mosque in Pattani businessman Abdullah Abdulwahab says, "Islam is getting stronger. Every mosque has a place to teach Islamic studies, and 40 percent of the people send their children to these schools. Each year, 1,000 people from the Pattani area do the Hajj. I did it three years ago, and I think I'll do it again." His confidence is surely right. Pattani, like the rest of southern Thailand, is leaving the era of the moped. Taking part in the noon prayer when we visited Pattani was a man with lettering on the back of his overalls. It said, "Chief Mechanic, Toyota, Pattani."
Written by John Andrews
Photographed by Nik Wheeler

Friday, April 29, 2011

Yala Car Bomb : Weak Excuse

The recent Monday's   and  Sunday's car bomb in Yala   shows once again that the violent  group of Patani Liberation movement in the deep South have every intention of continuing their bloody attacks. They clearly are working to step up the number of casualties, by increasing the ferocity of each attack. The latest of a string of vehicle bombs - three cars, one motorcycle - in central Yala town seemed to be aimed at a truckload of paramilitary rangers.But as usual, the great majority of casualties occurred among innocent bystanders and the owners of shops and houses along the street.The failure of security forces to check such violence is worrying on at least two levels. First, authorities had promised after the first Yala bomb - and the second, then the third - that they were stepping up defensive measures. Each bomb, each murder, each destruction of houses and shops brought another promise.On Monday, after an improvised bomb blew up a saloon car parked on Siroros Road, police offered a weak excuse. Officers had increased security measures in the southern town. "Perhaps officers got tired," offered Yala police chief Pol Maj Gen Chot Chawanwiwat.The second is the increasing availability of weapons and methods for the insurgent groups. There may be no direct foreign involvement in the southern violence, but there is plenty of indirect influence. The rebels without a discernible cause in the four southernmost provinces have never had a shortage of inspiration. From the terrorist training camps of Libya's Col Moammar Gadhafi to the videos and internet forums, the Patani Liberation movement  in Thailand  South never have wanted for examples of how to work their terrorism, intimidation and extortion.

In recent years, the terrorists of Iraq and of Indonesia have obviously given ideas to the southern insurgents. Car bombs, which emerged in the Libyan conflict of the late 1970s, recently have been a weapon of the Indonesian branch of al-Qaeda, the Jemaah Islamiyah.
The insurgents have beheaded more than 50 Thais including security forces and spy for the government intelligent work , based on the model of Thai Military cruel operations since two centuries ago   and that of the recent Iraq war.
Based on the past copycat performance of the Patani Liberation movements of the deep South, authorities have two more tactics to beware of. The first is a book bomb. Police in Indonesia have intercepted at least four bombs hidden in hollowed-out thick books, addressed to prominent personalities opposed to the JI.  none has actually reached the addressee and exploded - thanks to good detective work and community awareness.
In a more worrying development, a JI agent detonated a suicide bomb in Indonesia last week. That blast killed the bomber, and wounded 17 policemen at a station mosque during Friday prayers.
This presents a unique threat to Thailand. Even at their worst, the southern rebels never have resorted to the despicable suicide bomb. This terrible type of terror is only a threat, but authorities must be aware that the southern insurgents could well decide to adopt it from their Indonesian "brethren" on the basis of the worst treat and cruel practice from the Thai security forces and the worst words from the Thai extreme Nationalist public .                         

The sad fact is that authorities remain on their back foot in the South. The decision to revitalise the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre, staffing it with credible and knowledgeable officials, is a positive step. The recent army request for Indonesian advice on the southern conflict is a welcome development. It finally breaks the military's wrong perception that the Patani  Liberation movement in Thailand south are an isolated force, and have no outside connections or resources.
Much remains to be done. It is no excuse that officers "got tired", when Patani liberation movement  have been able to detonate four vehicle bombs. Much more consideration must be on Muslim Malay of Patani oriented center of solution, if the Thai government really need to end  centuries long political conflict.

Sunday, April 17, 2011

Southern Border Provinces Administration Act

The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) has become a juristic entity, following the enforcement of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act.
The Act was approved by the National Assembly in November 2010 and took effect on 30 December 2010 after it was published in the Royal Gazette. It covers all districts in the five southern border provinces, namely Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, and Satun.
Does SBPAC allow real  freedom of  Conscience to the people?

According to the new Act, SBPAC is a special government unit under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister and is not under the jurisdiction of any particular government agency. The Secretary-General of SBPAC, a senior civil servant equivalent to the status of a permanent secretary, serves as chief of this organization.
First established in 1981, SBPAC was disbanded in 2002 but was later revived in 2006. The Abhisit Vejjajiva administration proposed a bill on the restructuring of SBPAC, which received Cabinet approval in October 2009. The objective was to improve the integration of work in various agencies to develop the southern border provinces and tackle problems there effectively in a systematic manner. The strength of this law is that there will be unity in operation and evaluation, starting from the policy-making level to the implementation level, with the participation of all relevant sectors.
Under the Southern Bborder Provinces Administration Act, the Office of the National Security Council will work out administration and development policies to be submitted to the National Security Council and the Cabinet for approval. These policies will be revised every three years, or before three years, depending on necessity and the evolving situation. These policies will take into consideration local culture, religion, history, and way of life. Also participating in giving ideas and suggestions for the policies will be representatives from the public and private sectors, civil society, members of the media, religious leaders, and local wise men, known as prat chao ban. These people are members of the provincial administration and development advisory council.
Does Poverty the main cause of conflict south?
SBPAC will follow these policies to map out southern border provinces development strategies, and as guidelines for operations by all relevant agencies. They involve political, economic, social, religious, and cultural issues, as well as education, public health, natural resources, technology, foreign affairs, psychological operations,andmanagement.
The Southern Border Provinces Development Strategy Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, will approve the strategies, projects, and budget allocations to support development in the southern border provinces. The committee consists of political office holders and permanent government officials, as well as representatives of civil society and other organizations. Permanent government officials on this committee include the Secretary-General of the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, the Secretary-General of the Office of the National Security Council, the Budget Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Secretary-General of the Internal Security Operation Command, and governors of the southern border provinces.
In addition, SBPAC is responsible for protecting the rights and liberties of local people and ensuring justice for them. It will receive complaints and provide assistance for local people, and solve problems concerning officials behaving inappropriately. SBPAC will also offer assistance and rehabilitation for the people affected by the treatment of officials due to unrest in the deep South.
The Southern Border Provinces Development Strategy Committee will meet on January 24, when the Prime Minister will hold a briefing on the policies and operations of the committee and SBPAC in its new structure. 
Does New SBPAC change the situation?

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Anatomy of a Forgotten Conflict


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